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In many developed countries a decline in fertility has occurred.  This development has been 
attributed to greater education of women. However, establishing a causal link is difficult as 
both fertility and education have changed secularly. The contribution of this paper is to study 
the connection between fertility and education over a woman’s fertile period focusing on 
whether the relationship is causal. We study fertility in Norway and use an educational reform 
as an instrument to correct for selection into education. Our results indicate that increasing  
education leads to postponement of first births away from teenage motherhood towards 
having the first birth in their twenties and, for a smaller group, up to the age of 35-40. We do 
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1. Introduction 
The demographic transition in developed countries is characterised by low fertility and 
mortality rates. Low fertility has come to be an issue of public concern as low population 
growth and higher dependency ratios due to the aging of the population have been argued to 
strangle economic growth (Turner et al., 1998). Many policy observers and researchers have 
pointed to the timing of the secular decline in fertility in the Western countries and the 
increased education level for women and suggested that increased education for women leads 
to lower completed fertility (Schultz, 1997; Cochrane, 1979; Skirbekk, Kohler and Prskawetz, 
2004).  However, while numerous studies have found support for a correlation between 
female education and fertility decisions, there are few examples that establish the causal effect 
of female education on fertility decisions.  Many factors are likely to influence fertility, 
education and employment decisions including unobservable factors that are difficult to 
control for. Thus, causation is difficult to establish.
  
Compared to most other developed countries, Nordic countries have high levels of 
completed fertility.  The number of children per woman in the different countries has 
converged over time and for those cohorts who have now completed their fertility, the number 
of children is close to the replacement level at 2.1 (Sleebos, 2003; Björklund, 2006). The 
major policy concern in Nordic countries is the increasing number of childless women and the 
fact that the younger cohorts of women are having fewer children (Skrede and Rønsen, 2006). 
In this paper we exploit an educational reform which extended the mandatory years of 
schooling from 7 to 9 years to identify the causal effect of education on both the timing of, 
and completed, fertility of women born between 1947 and 1958 in Norway.
1 During the 1960s 
in Norway, there was a large change in the compulsory schooling laws affecting primary and 
                                                 
1 This extends Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) who studied the effect of the same reform on teenage 
pregnancy.    3 
middle schools.  Pre-reform, the Norwegian education system required children to attend 
school through the seventh grade; after the reform, this was extended to the ninth grade, 
adding two years of required schooling.  Evidence in the literature suggests that these reforms 
had a large and significant impact on educational attainment. Central to our identification 
strategy, implementation of the reform occurred in different municipalities at different times, 
starting in 1960 and continuing through 1972, leading to variation at municipal level as well 
as over time in the minimum years of schooling.   
We examine the relationship between the education of women and three fertility 
outcomes: the timing of children; childlessness; and the number of children. The data shows 
the expected correlation between fertility outcomes and education: women with more 
education are more often childless; they have fewer children and postpone births. However, 
despite these statistically significant correlations, we do not find evidence of a causal 
relationship between the length of education and completed fertility or childlessness when 
using the reform as an instrument for education. Our main finding is that increased mandatory 
education lead to the postponement of births: there are fewer cases of teenage motherhood 
and more first births among women aged 35 to 40 years.  
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 begins with a brief overview of the 
literature on the relationship between fertility and education before presenting data on fertility 
in Norway and the institutional setting, outlining the major elements of the support system for 
parents in Norway.  Section 3 describes the change in compulsory schooling that is used as an 
instrument in this study. The identification strategy is formalised in section 4. Section 5 
presents the data. The results are presented in section 6 and section 7 concludes. 
    4 
2.  The institutional setting 
Education and fertility 
Economists have modelled fertility in terms of the costs and benefits of children. In this 
setting, education may affect fertility decisions through several channels. For example, 
education may provide better knowledge of contraceptives or educational activity may be 
incompatible with time spent engaged in childcare. Of special focus has been the impact of 
changes in labour market returns as a result of greater education.
2 In theory, the predicted 
effect of a rise in female wages on completed fertility is unclear because it depends on the 
magnitude of the different substitution and income effects. However, the conventional 
prediction (Becker, 1960 and Willis, 1973) is that, as child-rearing is a time-intensive activity, 
higher wages that raise a woman’s opportunity cost of time will lead her to want fewer 
children but to put more resources into each child’s upbringing.  
Models of the timing of births (as distinct from the quantity) present a trade-off 
between the greater pleasure of early births and the lower costs of later births with a focus on 
the latter.
3 Much attention has been given to models that consider lifetime earnings, 
consumption smoothing and career planning rather than current incomes and wages. The 
literature points to woman’s career costs as the most important explanation in favour of 
postponing births. In addition to the direct wage loss during labour force withdrawals, there is 
a loss in the returns to human capital in later periods due to depreciation.
4  
                                                 
2 Hotz et al. (1997) provide a review of static models on completed fertility. 
3 Happel et al. (1984) assume that there is no pure time preference associated with the household’s “effective” 
number of children. 
4 Gustafsson (2001) presents a list of parameters that will have a positive effect on birth postponement: the 
amount of pre-maternity human capital; the rate of depreciation of human capital due to non-use of human 
capital; the rate of return to human capital investment; and the length of time spent out of the labour force. In 
addition, the profile of human capital investments may play a role. Ignoring depreciation, theory has been 
ambiguous about whether a steep earnings function leads to earlier or postponed births (Cigno and Ermisch, 
1989). Gustafsson argues that commonly used earnings profiles favour birth postponement.    5 
To identify the causal effects of education, several studies have employed rules and 
regulations concerning school entry or dropout. An early and important contribution to the 
“natural experiment” literature is given by Angrist and Krueger in their 1991 paper where 
they used the quarter of birth as an instrument for educational attainment in earnings 
equations. The quarter of birth is correlated with the length of education because pupils were 
allowed to leave school by 16 years of age. To study the effects of education on fertility 
outcomes several recent papers have used the same source of variation. McCrary and Royer 
(2006) use the school entry date as an instrument and data from Texas and California. Their 
sample is selected because their source of data is birth certificates. They find no effect of 
mother’s education on the timing of first births for women 23 years of age or younger. 
Fort (2006) utilized an Italian mandatory school reform introduced in 1963 that 
prescribed junior high school attendance, so that compulsory schooling increased from five to 
eight years. The implementation period turned out to be unintentionally long and compliance 
was poor, especially in Southern Italy. The estimated effects are restricted to those who had at 
most eight years of schooling. Her findings suggest that the reform led these women to 
postpone their first childbirth, but they caught up in terms of fertility by age 26.
5 However, 
Fort is not able to control for region, and economic conditions, traditions regarding fertility 
and labour market aspirations differed profoundly between regions.
6  
For Norway, Lappegård and Rønsen (2005) present data for trends in the timing of 
first births for women born in the period between 1955 and 1969.  They use longitudinal data 
up to 2001 and estimate a hazard model where education is treated as a time-varying 
covariate. Education is studied in several dimensions, including activity, length and field. 
They conclude that being a student clearly delays motherhood, but that the effect of length of 
                                                 
5 Effects of education on the timing of first childbirth are estimated for age levels 18 to 26 years, and are found 
to be statistically negative for ages 19 to 21 years. 
6 Fort notes that sample sizes are too small to include region as a covariate. In addition, she lacks information on 
where the women lived at the time when they were around junior high school age.    6 
education primarily works through the prolonged participation in the educational system. 
Field of study is found to have a separate impact, and is interpreted as mirroring different 
educational and career aspirations. However, this study does not correct for selection, i.e., the 
possibility that omitted, probably unobservable, factors influence both educational and 
fertility decisions. 
Closest to our paper is Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) who study the 
relationship between education and the probability of teenage motherhood.
7 The authors use 
changes in compulsory schooling laws in the USA and Norway as instruments for education 
in the two countries to identify the effect under two very different institutional environments. 
They find evidence that increasing mandatory education reduces the incidence of teenage 
motherhood and that the size of the effect is quite similar in the USA and Norway. Their 




Norway has seen changes over time in the support systems for the costs of bringing up 
children such as direct financial support and the provision of public day care, as well as the 
availability and acceptance of contraception and in norms towards single mothers.
9 Thus an 
understanding of the setting is important to establish that the educational reform is not 
correlated with other policies that affect the costs of bringing up children.  
The support system for parents differs somewhat according to family type. For 
cohabitating or married mothers, the programs with the greatest implications for the cost of a 
                                                 
7 To our knowledge, this is the only existing paper that aims to estimate a causal relationship between fertility 
and education using Norwegian data. 
8 Skirbekk, Kohler and Prskawetz (2004) analysed the causal effect on the timing of fertility (and marriage) 
using Swedish data and exploiting the administrative rule for school start age in Sweden.  They found quite 
strong effects on the timing of birth on graduation age for women.  
9 Skrede and Rønsen (2006) argue that what is regarded as Nordic “family policy” has not been aimed at fertility 
outcomes, e.g. sustainable total fertility levels, but rather at facilitating the combination of workforce 
participation and involvement in domestic tasks by both parents.    7 
child are the statutory universal rights parents have in connection with birth and the supply of 
subsidized childcare (Rønsen, 2004). A universal right to 12 weeks paid maternity leave was 
introduced in 1956, but the income compensation was relatively low. A major extension came 
in 1978 when maternity benefits were raised to cover 100% of the pre-birth income for 18 
weeks.
10 This entitlement was extended to 20 weeks in 1987 and 22 weeks in 1988. Since 
1993, mothers can choose between 42 weeks maternity leave at full pay and 52 weeks at 80% 
compensation. Since 1977, parents have been entitled to unpaid leave with job security until 
the child is one year old.
11 The support system for single mothers is even more extensive and, 
from the early 1960s onwards, became very generous (Rønsen and Strøm, 1991). The system 
for single parents consists of several elements. The main part is a right-based support via the 
social security system ensuring single parents an income and temporary assistance to enable 
them to support themselves until the child is ten years old. This system was introduced in 
1964 and became a part of the social security system in 1971. Together with other benefits, 
this enabled non-working single parents to take care of their children without working. 
Support was, and still is, income-dependent, i.e., reduced if the mother is working. The 
system was made less generous in 1998 (Skrede and Rønsen, 2006).  
Another important element of the support system is income-dependent support for 
housing. Single mothers also receive financial support from the father if the father’s name is 
registered with the authorities, and the authorities assist in enforcing child support payments. 
All parents receive a tax-free child allowance in Norway and single parents get about 1000 
NOK extra per month in 2007.  
Public day care, which is subsidized in Norway, is subject to excess demand. Single 
parents pay a reduced rate for day care. Enrolment rates have risen sharply, from 5% in 1973 
                                                 
10 To be eligible for maternity leave, the mother has to have worked for a certain period during pregnancy. From 
1977, the requirement is six of the last ten months prior to birth. Alternatively, she gets a tax-free cash benefit at 
delivery, NOK 4730 in 1988 (Rønsen, 2004) and NOK 33,584 in 2007. 
11 Women working in the public sector can have longer unpaid leave, up to three years in total, but not less than 
one year per child. For instance, parents with three children are entitled to 3+1+1 years of unpaid leave.    8 
to 21% by 1980, 36% in 1990, 40% by 1992 and 54% in 2001 (Rønsen, 2004). The excess 
demand has been met by different forms of private childcare. 
Attitudes towards teenage mothers became more accepting in Norway during the 
1970s (see Furre, 1996).  Knowledge about sexual behaviour was made part of the 
compulsory school curriculum and contraceptives became more widely available. The pill 
was introduced in the late 1960s and was widely used. It is estimated that among teenage girls 
aged 18 to 19 years in 1977 only 10% of those who had sexual intercourse did not use the pill 
or another type of contraceptive; by 1988, an even higher proportion used contraceptives 
(Noack and Østby, 1991). Abortion was legalized in Norway in 1979.
12  
We study in this paper women born between 1947 and 1958. Thus these various 
policy changes aimed at reducing the costs of fertility will have affected this group. For 
example, these women were in their peak fertility ages (20 to 31 years old) when the major 
extension of maternity rights was implemented in 1978, though the much more generous 
maternity leave reform in 1993 came too late to have any widespread impact as the women 
studied were then aged between 35 to 46 years. Changes in availability of contraception and 
norms towards single parents also started within our period of analyses, though in this case 
will apply to the younger, but not the older, cohorts in our data. Our approach therefore has to 
control for these changes brought about by national policies and attitudinal change.  
 
3.  Changes to compulsory schooling laws 
This paper exploits the differential introduction of an increase in compulsory schooling across 
municipalities in Norway to identify the impact of greater education on fertility. We begin by 
describing the changes in the schooling laws and then examine whether the date of 
                                                 
12 One would expect that access to legalized abortion may explain the drastic reduction in the number of teenage 
births in Norway from the late 1970s onwards, but in fact, the incidence of abortion has decreased, especially 
among teenagers from the early 1980s onwards (Lappegård, 2000).    9 
implementation in each municipality is likely to be a function of fertility or other observed 
factors that may be associated with fertility decisions. 
In 1959, the Norwegian Parliament legislated mandatory school reform that increased 
the minimum level of education by extending the number of compulsory years of education 
from seven to nine years (thereby increasing the minimum dropout age from 14 to 16, as 
students start school at age seven). There were no exemptions to these laws. In addition, the 
reform standardized the curriculum and increased access to schools, as nine years of 
mandatory schooling was eventually made available in all municipalities. 
The goal of standardizing the curriculum was to improve the average level of quality 
of the schools; the increase in mandatory education was therefore likely accompanied by an 
improvement in school quality.  As a result, our estimates will incorporate both the increase in 
years of education along with an improvement in quality.  Given the positive correlation 
between the two, we will likely overestimate the effect of extra years of education on 
children’s educational attainment. 
The parliament mandated that all municipalities (the lowest level of local 
administration) implemented the reform by 1973. As a result, although it was started in 1960, 
implementation was not completed until 1972.
13 This suggests that for more than a decade 
Norwegian schools were divided into two separate systems. The system experienced by 
children would depend on year of birth and municipality of residence. The first cohort that 
could have potentially been subject to the reform was that born in 1947. These individuals 
started school in 1954, and either finished pre-reform compulsory school in 1961, or went to 
primary school from 1954 to 1960, followed by post-reform middle school from 1960 to 
1963. The last cohort who could have gone through the old system was born in 1958. This 
cohort started school in 1965 and finished compulsory schooling in 1972. 
                                                 
13 The reform had already started on a small and explorative basis in the late 1950s, but applied to a negligible 
number of students because only a few small municipalities, each with a small number of schools, were 
involved. See Lie (1974), Telhaug (1969) and Lindbekk (1992), for descriptions of the reform.    10 
To receive funds from the government to implement the reform, municipalities needed 
to present a plan to a committee under the Ministry of Education. Once approved, the costs of 
teachers and buildings were provided by the national government. While the criteria 
determining selection by the committee are somewhat unclear, the committee wanted to 
ensure that implementation was representative across the country, conditional on an 
acceptable plan. (Telhaug, 1969, Mediås, 2000).
14 Figure 1 in the Appendix depicts the spread 
of the reform, focusing on the number of municipalities implementing the reform each year. 
For our identification strategy to work, we need, inter alia, the data of implementation 
to be uncorrelated with fertility in the municipality. We include municipality fixed effects and 
municipality-specific trends in our specifications, and hence it is not necessary for our 
estimation strategy that fertility outcomes are uncorrelated with the timing of the 
implementation of the reform across municipalities. If other fertility enhancing changes took 
place differently across Norwegian municipalities but in a linear fashion, they will be picked 
up by the municipality-specific trends. However, it is useful to look in more detail as to 
whether the implementation of the reform is uncorrelated with fertility behaviour.  In what 
follows, we discuss some of the main technological or policy changes that may have affected 
fertility and relate them to the reform implementation process. 
In a comparative study of Norwegian family policy, the programs with the greatest 
implications for the cost of a child are regarded to be the availability of subsidized child care 
and maternity leave (Rønsen, 2004).  Maternity leave is decided at a national level so the 
effect of these policies will be picked up by cohort fixed effects, as all municipalities would 
have been subject to the policy change at the same pace and with equal strength.  Day care is 
state-subsidized in Norway and has been subject to excess demand.  At a national level, 
                                                 
14 Similar school reforms were undertaken in many other European countries in the same period, notably 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and, to some extent, France and Germany (Leschinsky and Mayer, 1990).    11 
enrolment rates have risen sharply
15.  But the availability of day care, and the fees charged to 
parents, have varied profoundly among Norwegian municipalities.  For instance, enrolment 
for children under the age of 6 ranged from 11 to 92 percent in 1991 (Kravdal, 1996).   Two 
studies on the association between day care supply and parity-specific fertility reach 
somewhat different conclusions regarding first births
16.  Kravdal (1996) studied the 
association between the local coverage rate for children 1-3 years old and the probability of a 
first birth for women aged 15-29 from cohorts born between 1945 and 1968.  The estimated 
relationship is negative but became statistically insignificant when controlling for region, 
degree of urbanization, occupational structure, religious activities, and female employment 
rate in 1980. Day-care supply appears to be important for timing of fertility only at the very 
lowest level of coverage (0-4 percent).  Interactions between day care coverage and 
educational level of the women were also not found to be statistically significant. Rønsen 
(2004) found a statistically significant negative association. But in this study, the data on day 
care coverage are less accurate, because the 1973 coverage levels have been used also for the 
years 1960-1973 and in contrast to Kravdal(1996), Rønsen did not control for degree of 
urbanization.  It is likely that the supply of day-care in the initial years was strongly correlated 
with urbanization, which is itself correlated with postponement of first births.   
The Norwegian legislation on induced abortion was liberalized in two steps during the 
1970s.  From 1976, induced abortion on social indications was legally accepted, and in 1979 
women won the right to induced abortion on demand (Skjeldestad, 1986).  Before the law 
implemented in 1979, applications for abortion had to be approved of by a local committee 
with two medical doctors as members.  The great majority of applications were approved
17. 
                                                 
15 The number of child care spaces per 100 children aged 0-6 has risen from 5 in 1973 and 13 in 1977, to 21 by 
1980, 36 in 1990, 40 by 1992 and 54 in 2001((Rønsen (2004) and Kravdal(1996)).   
16 For higher parities, Kravdal (1996) and Rønsen (2004) both find that the association is insignificant; negative 
for second birth and positive for third birth.   
   
17 The approval rate was 90% in the early 1970s and 98% in 1978 (Blom and Elvbakken, 2001)     12 
However, the liberalization of the law in 1979 was not followed by an increase in abortion 
rates. On the contrary, the general abortion rate decreased from 1975 onwards (Skjeldestad, 
1986).
18 Skjeldestad studied induced abortion in seven counties from all parts of the country 
in the period 1972-1983
19.  He concludes that the difference in abortion rates among the 
counties remained the same throughout the period of the study, except for one county 
(Finnmark).  Thus, the law changes did not lead to any drastic changes in abortion rates either 
at a national level or regional level.   
Østby (1983) examined the use of contraceptives in the 1960s and 1970s and found 
that there was very little difference in the proportion who used contraceptives from one region 
to another, but that the proportion was somewhat higher in densely populated areas.  The use 
of contraceptives followed a rising trend that was parallel for municipalities of different 
centrality (Østby, 1983, fig. 3). By 1988, the use of contraceptives  is about equally 
widespread in sparsely and densely populated areas (Noack and Østby, 1991).  It seems 
reasonable to think of the diffusion of contraceptive technology and the change in norms as a 
gradual process, which can be captured by municipality-specific trends and cohort fixed 
effects.   
As a more formal examination of whether reform was endogenous to fertility, we 
examine the relationship between the introduction of the reform (by municipality) and the pre 
reform changes in rates of teenage pregnancy.  We estimate a hazard model of time to 
implementation where the explanatory variable is the lagged change in teenage birth rate 
                                                 
18 The decrease from 1975 onwards refers to the whole population of women.  But there is one important 
exception:  the age group 15-19. For this group the abortion rate (legally induced abortions per 1000 women in 
age group)  increased from 13.0 in 1972 to 21.8 in 1976 and 1977.  This age group is most affected by 
educational reform and presumably most constrained in their choice before the liberalization of the laws.  Our 
cohorts were 15-19 in 1962-1973. The increase in teenage abortion rates from 1972 onwards are therefore only 
relevant for the last two cohorts in our sample.   
19 These seven counties represent 23 % of the total population of fertile women in Norway.  Taken together, they 
have the same abortion rate as the whole population for the period where a comparison is possible (from 1979-
1983, Skjeldestad, 1986).  The author considers them to be “a reasonably good estimate of the development of 
induced abortion in Norway.”      13 
(birth rate defined as the number of first births in the age group 15-20 years per 100 women of 
that age group in the municipality).  The results, shown in Table A1 in the Appendix, shows 
there is no relationship between the lagged change (from 2 to 5 years) in teenage fertility and 
the timing of reform.   
Other municipality characteristics may also be associated with fertility outcomes. For 
example, poorer municipalities might be earlier implementers of the reform given the 
substantial state subsidies, while wealthier municipalities would move at a much slower pace. 
However, research which has examined the determinants of the timing of implementation 
finds no relationship between municipality characteristics such as average earnings, taxable 
income and educational level, and the timing of implementation. Municipalities that were 
located geographically near municipalities that had already implemented the reform were 
themselves more likely to implement the reform (interviews revealed that this was likely due 
to a particularly effective county administrator).  This research supports a complex adoption 
process without finding support for the implementation process to be explained by one single 
factor (Lie, 1973, 1974)..  
Aakvik, Salvanes and Vaage (2008) and Black and Salvanes (2008) find no support 
for a relationship between the timing of the educational reform and education level, income 
level or the size of the municipalities. As a further test, in Table A2, we regress the year of 
implementation on different background variables based on municipality averages, including 
parental income, the level of education, average age and the size of the municipality, as well 
as county dummies (there are twenty counties in Norway). Consistent with the existing 
literature, there appears to be no systematic relationship between the timing of 
implementation and parental average earnings, educational level, average age, urban/rural 
status, industry or labour force composition, municipality unemployment rates in 1960 and    14 
the share of individuals who were members of the Labour party (the most pro-reform and 
dominant political party). 
 
4.  Our identification strategy 
Our source of exogenous variation in mothers’ education is the education reform in Norway 
that increased the number of years of compulsory schooling from 7 to 9 years and was 
implemented over a 12 year period from 1960 to 1972 in different municipalities at different 
times. We observe the children of this generation in 2002. 
Our empirical model is given by the following two equations: 
ij j j i i i MUNTREND TY MUNICIPALI COHORT ED Y ε β β β β β + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0    (1) 
 
ij j j i j i MUNTREND TY MUNICIPALI COHORT REFORM ED υ α α α α α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0  (2)
  
Yi is the fertility outcome. We study three fertility outcomes: the timing of children; the 
number of children; and childlessness: the first and third of these are binary variables. ED is 
the number of years of education obtained, COHORT refers to a full set of years of age 
indicators, MUNICIPALITY refers to a full set of municipality indicators, MUNTREND 
denotes municipality-specific trends, and REFORM equals 1 if the individual was affected by 
the education reform and 0 otherwise. We estimate the model using Two Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) so that equation (2) is the first stage and REFORM  serves as an instrumental variable 
forED. In our estimation, we test the strength of the first stage relationship. 
Our identification strategy rests on the assumptions that we can isolate the exogenous 
variation in education that results from the reform and that the reform affects fertility only via 
education. In terms of the first assumption, equation (1) contains fixed cohort and 
municipality effects. The first of these allow for secular changes in educational attainment 
over time that may be completely unrelated to compulsory schooling laws; the second allows 
for variation in the timing of the reform across municipalities that may not have been    15 
exogenous to educational choice. However, our discussion in Section 3 above has indicated 
that the adoption of reform does not appear to be associated with possible political concerns 
over fertility (the change in teenage pregnancy rates) or with other observed characteristics of 
the municipality.  We also allow for municipality specific trends to pick up other observables 
which were trended differentially across municipalities.    
In terms of the assumption that reform only affects fertility via education, many of the 
policy changes that might affect the costs of having children - and so affect fertility - were, as 
documented above, implemented at national level and introduced at the same date in all 
municipalities. These will not destroy our identification strategy. Attitudinal changes might be 
more likely to be variable across municipalities but, as shown above, these tend to be related 
to urban-ness, which is controlled for by the municipality fixed effects. The possibility 
remains that the reform timing was associated with unobserved characteristics which may 
affect fertility. But in our design, even if the reform was implemented first in areas with 
certain unobserved characteristics, consistent estimation is still achieved so long as (a) these 
characteristics are fixed over time; (b) the implementation of the law change is uncorrelated 
with changes in these characteristics; or (c) these characteristics are unrelated to the 
probability of childlessness, the timing of births and the number of children. As these 
characteristics are unobservable, we cannot test this directly. 
   
5. Data 
Based on different administrative registers and census data from Statistics Norway, a 
comprehensive data set has been compiled of the entire population in Norway, including 
information on family background, age, marital status, country of birth, educational history,    16 
neighbourhood information and employment information.
20 To this, we match extracts from 
the censuses in 1960, 1970 and 1980.  
Our sample contains all women born between 1947 and 1958. To determine whether 
women were affected by the changed compulsory schooling legislation, we link each woman 
to the municipality where she grew up by matching the administrative data to the 1960 
census. From the 1960 census, we know the municipality where the woman’s mother lived in 
1960.
21 The women we are using in the estimation are aged between two and 13 years in 
1960. The indicator will be equal to one for a woman if by age 13 (the seventh year of 
schooling), the new system had been implemented in her municipality of residence, which is 
defined as where her mother lived in 1960. One concern is that there may be a selective 
migration into or out of municipalities that implemented the reform early. However, because 
the reform implementation did not occur before 1960, reform-induced mobility should not be 
a problem. 
22 A related concern is that random mobility at any point after we assign location 
may imply that an individual is not actually impacted by the reform, although we classify 
them as being so. This creates a measurement error problem that will tend to bias our 
estimates of the effects of the reform towards zero. 
The measure of educational attainment is taken from a separate data source maintained 
by Statistics Norway. Educational attainment is reported by the educational establishment 
directly to Statistics Norway, thereby minimizing any measurement error due to misreporting. 
This register provides detailed information on educational attainment. The educational 
register started in 1970; for women who completed their education before then, we use 
information from the 1970 Census. Thus, the register data are used for all but the earliest 
cohorts of women who did not have any education after 1970. Census data are self-reported 
                                                 
20 See Møen, Salvanes and Sørensen (2003) for a description of the data set. 
21 As very few children live with their father in cases where the parents are not living together, we should only 
have minimal misclassification through applying this rule. 
22 Evidence from Meghir and Palme (2005) for Sweden and Telhaug (1969) for Norway suggests that reform-
induced migration is not a significant consideration.    17 
(four-digit codes of types of education were reported) and the information is considered to be 
very accurate; there are no spikes or changes in the education data from the early to the later 
cohorts. 
Our primary data source on the timing of the reform in individual municipalities is 
from Ness (1971). To verify the dates provided by Ness, we examined the data to determine 
whether there appears to be a clear break in the fraction of students with less than nine years 
of education. In the rare instances when the data did not seem consistent with the timing 
stated in Ness, we checked individual municipalities by contacting local sources.
23 We are 
able to successfully calculate reform indicators for 672 of the 732 municipalities in existence 
in 1960. If the reform took more than one year to implement in a particular municipality, or 
we were unable to verify the information given in Ness (1971), we could not assign a reform 
indicator to that municipality.  
We observe the children on our sample in 2002. At that date, the youngest women in 
our sample were 44 years of age and thus for all but a tiny minority we observe the complete 
fertility history. 
24 From the year and month of birth of the children and the year and month of 
birth of the mother, we can determine the age of the mother at birth to the nearest month. We 
exclude from our sample the small number of women who have a birth before they are aged 
15 years and define a teenage birth as one occurring when the mother has not yet reached her 
20




Table 1 presents the key explanatory variables as well as background and outcome variables, 
the sample split by whether the individual was subject to the reform or not. The estimation 
sample consists of 290,604 women, 53% (154,818 individuals) of whom were affected by the 
                                                 
23 Between 1960 and 1970, a number of municipalities merged. In our analysis, we use the 1960 municipality as 
the unit of observation (Juvkam, 1999). In cases where the data were available at the 1970 municipality level, 
individual municipalities were contacted to determine the appropriate coding. 
24 We also do not observe birth dates of children who subsequently died.    18 
reform. The subsample that lived in municipalities for which the reform was implemented 
had, on average, more education (a difference of 0.5 years). While the reform mandated nine 
years of schooling, the mean length of education for those not affected by the reform was 
11.25 years, so many women had more than nine years of education even without the reform. 
The reform cohorts were born later (on average 4.5 years) as the reform was implemented 
gradually. The long-run trend to greater education explains at least part of the 0.5 year 
difference in average schooling. 
As for fertility outcomes, the differences in means are small between the two groups. 
Within the reform group, there are more women who are childless and the average number of 
children is slightly lower. The probability of teenage motherhood (first birth before age 20) is 
very similar for the two groups, but the group subject to the reforms was less likely to give 
birth in the first half of their twenties, and had a higher propensity to give birth after the age 
of 30 years. 
These data are the result of cohort change as well as reform status. To separate cohort 
and reform status, Figures 1 to 7 present the outcomes by cohort, splitting the data into those 
subject to the reforms and those who were not. Figure 1 shows the time trend in the mean 
probability of a teen birth. This is higher in the non-reform group for almost all cohorts as 
well as showing a rise (for both groups) for those born from the early 1950s onwards. Figure 
2 shows a slight decline in the probability of having a first child when aged between 20 and 
25 as the cohorts get younger, which is matched by a slight increase for these same cohorts in 
having a first child between 25 and 30. However, the differences in these outcomes by reform 
status are small. Figures 4 and 5 show the trend towards first births being delayed until 
women are in their thirties. Later-born women were more likely to have first births later, and 
there is a greater tendency towards this in the reform group. For the youngest cohort (those 
born in 1958), the probability of not having a first child until 35 years or older is 0.032 for    19 
those subject to the reform; the corresponding figure for those who were not subject to the 
reform is 0.025, a percentage difference of about 30%. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the 
average number of children over the cohorts. Total fertility is quite stable over time and there 
is little difference between groups.
25 Figure 7 shows the trend in the probability of being 
childless. This increases for both reform and non-reform groups over time, but increases more 
for the reform group than their untreated counterparts. 
Overall, the raw data suggest that those subject to the reforms were more likely to 
delay first birth, resulting in a drop in teenage motherhood and an increase in first births for 
those women in their thirties. There is also possibly some indication that the reforms resulted 




Table 2 presents our key results. Each coefficient is derived from a separate regression, each 
of which controls for municipality and year of birth. Municipality-specific trends were 
initially included, but were not statistically significant and the results did not change when 
including them, so they are not included in the results reported here.
26  
In row 1 we present the OLS estimates of the correlation between years of education 
and the different fertility outcomes (i.e. estimation of equation (1)). The estimates show the 
expected strong statistical relationship between the length of education and fertility. Women 
who have more years of schooling have a higher tendency to remain childless; they also have 
fewer children and the probability of a first childbirth among the age groups less than 25 years 
decreases with education. These correlations estimated are of a rather large magnitude. For 
                                                 
25 The 1958 cohort is an outlier.  The number of non-reform women in that cohort is small (238 observations). 
26 The F tests have been executed after OLS estimations for each fertility outcome. F-values range from 0.50 to 
0.76 with a critical value of 1.30.  Available from authors.    20 
example, the probability of remaining childless increases by half a percentage point for each 
additional year of education. 
Our interest lies in the causal relationship of education and so in the coefficients from 
models where the educational reform is used as an instrument for education. The second row 
presents the results from the 2SLS estimation. The results show that the impact of education is 
to reduce the probability of a teen birth and delay first births into the twenties and late thirties, 
but it has no effect on completed family size. Therefore, the effect of schooling is essentially 
to delay child bearing. In contrast with the raw association with education, when controlling 
for possible selection into education, there is no significant relationship between length of 
education and the number of children born to a woman or the probability of never having 
children. The first stage equation is presented in Table A4 and shows a strong impact of the 
reform on educational attainment.  
The magnitude of the estimated effects on timing is considerable.  At the margin, each 
year of additional education reduces the probability of teenage motherhood by 8 percentage 
points, which is a large impact relative to the frequency of teenage motherhood in the whole 
sample, which is 16.6 %.
27 Likewise, the increase in probability of giving first birth aged 35 
to 40 is 2 percentage points, which is almost as much as the frequency (3%) in the population.  
The estimated effect when controlling for possible endogeneity is substantially larger than the 
OLS estimate: a common result when using these kinds of instruments due to heterogeneity in 
the effect of education (Card, 1999; Aakvik, Vaage and Salvanes, 2008).  The effect estimated 
is a local average treatment effect and at the bottom part of the education distribution the 
returns are expected to be high from two extra years of education.  
                                                 
27 The proportion of first birth by age in the sample is as follows: 0.17 in age group 15–20 years, 0.39 in age 
group 20–25, 0.23 in age group 25–30, 0.08 in age group 30–35 and 0.03 in age group 35–40, while the 
remaining 11% of the sample are childless. The mean size of a cohort of women in the whole population is about 
32,000 individuals for the years 1947–1958.    21 
To further test that our results are driven by the impact of education and not some 
omitted time-varying change in tastes, we used a regression discontinuity approach and re-
estimated the OLS and the 2SLS results using a sample restricted to those girls who are most 
likely to be affected by the reform. We define these as those who were aged thirteen within 
five years before or after the year of reform implementation. The results are presented in 
Table 3. The correlation between education and the various fertility outcomes estimated by 
OLS are very similar to those in Table 2.  The coefficient estimates for the causal model are 
also very similar to those in Table 2.  The statistical significance of the estimates falls, due to 
the smaller sample, and the impact of education on first births at age 35-40 is not longer 
statistically significant, but the effect of education on delaying births beyond the teenage 
years is still well defined. 
Discussion 
We can think of two mechanisms through which education can affect fertility. First, 
schooling is an activity that may reduce the possibility of behaviour that may lead to 
pregnancy. This is often referred to as the “incarceration effect”. Second, education is an 
investment in human capital and may affect both the timing of births and the number of 
children. The incarceration effect is, by nature, temporary. If opportunity costs influence 
fertility in a lifetime perspective, it must be through the human capital effect. 
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) argue that if there is an incarceration effect, the 
data should show an increase in first births at ages 16 and 17 years after the dropout age was 
raised from 14 to 16 years. They find the opposite. We use essentially the same data and also 
find that there is no catch-up in first births in the 15 to 20 age groups. This shows the reform 
lead to more than merely an incarceration effect. 
Our main finding is that the reform resulted in a postponement of births away from 
very early births and towards first birth at a later age. Due to the unfavourable consequences    22 
of teenage births, the results from increasing education that we find should be regarded as 
positive. Furthermore, the data does not show any statistically significant effects of the reform 
on total fertility. The allegation that education inevitably leads to fewer children being born is 
therefore not supported by our data. As a caveat, if more schooling makes women tend to 
postpone their first birth until the end of their fertile period, this may have unfavourable 
consequences in terms of increased risks of fecundity problems, which will have costs to 
individuals and, in a publicly funded system, to the health care system. 
The effects we find are “local average treatment effects”: the reform only affects those 
who change their behaviour because of the reform i.e., those who would have chosen seven or 
eight years of education if compulsory schooling had not been extended to nine years. It may 
seem far-fetched that these women should postpone their first birth until the age of 35 to 40 
years. However, it is likely that there is a great deal of heterogeneity between women in how 
they respond to the reform. Our results show that in most cases where first births were 
postponed due to the reform, the first birth took place at age 20 to 25 or 25 to 30 instead, 
although the difference between the reform and the non-reform group is not statistically 
significant for these age groups. However, it is also plausible that the reform could lead some 
women into a different “track” in life: having had more compulsory schooling, the women 
impacted by the reform may have invested more than they otherwise would in secondary 
education or on-the-job training.  Their preferences regarding when to have children may 
have changed so that they want to postpone birth as long as possible for career reasons. 
28 
 
                                                 
28 In principle, institutional changes may alter both timing and total fertility, for instance by making childless 
women change their mind. Perhaps the 1993 extension of paid leave spurred fertility in the reform group among 
cohorts that were fertile but still childless. In our sample these would be the 1953-1958 cohorts who would be 
aged 35-40 years.  To assess the effect of the 1993 reform, we would need total fertility data on younger cohorts 
that is not yet available.     23 
7.  Conclusion 
 
Using an educational reform as an instrument for education, we are able to investigate the 
causal effect of education on fertility. The data indicates that increasing education at the lower 
tail of the education distribution leads young women to postpone first births away from 
teenage motherhood towards having the first birth in their twenties and, for a small but 
statistically significant group, until the age of 35 to 40 years. This result cannot be explained 
as a mere “incarceration effect”, and we interpret it as mainly the result of increased human 
capital accumulation because of the reform. While the length of education and various fertility 
outcomes are found to be highly correlated, the data do not support any strong causal 
relationship other than the postponement of first birth. In particular, we find no evidence that 
more education results in more women being childless or leads to women having fewer 
children.    24 
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Figure 1. Mean unconditional probability of first birth age 15-20 by cohort and reform status 
 























1947 1948  1949 1950 1951  1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
reform=0 
reform=1      27
Figure 3. Mean unconditional probability of first birth age 25-30 by cohort and reform status.  
 
 
Figure 4. Mean unconditional probability of first birth age 30-35 by cohort and reform status.  
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Table 1.Descriptive statistics: data separated by whether women lived in a reform 
municipality at age 13 
   Without reform (n=135786)  With reform (n=154818) 
 Mean  Std.Dev. Min Max Mean    Std.Dev. Min Max
Years of education  11.25 2.66 7 21 11.72  2.47 7 21
Year of birth  1950.62 2.56 1947 1958 1955.08  2.43 1947 1958
Background variables*:              
1 if lived in one of the ten major cities in 1960 0.153 0.360 0 1 0.226  0.418 0 1
1 if lived in one of 49 other cities in 1960  0.123 0.329 0 1 0.110  0.313 0 1
Father's years of schooling  8.65 2.54 7 18 8.97  2.66 7 18
Father's age in 1960  42.58 7.55 6 90 37.55  7.49 2 90
Mother's years of schooling  7.94 1.65 7 18 8.19  1.78 7 18
Mother's age in 1960  39.05 6.80 7 89 34.04  6.85 4 86
Parents' income in 1970, 100 NOK  256.28 285.05 0 14439 378.61  254.14 0 14058
Outcome variables:              
1 if first birth at age 15-20  0.165 0.371 0 1 0.167  0.373 0 1
1 if first birth at age 20-25  0.417 0.493 0 1 0.363  0.481 0 1
1 if first birth at age 25-30  0.220 0.414 0 1 0.235  0.424 0 1
1 if first birth at age 30-35  0.069 0.254 0 1 0.088  0.284 0 1
1 if first birth at age 35-40  0.022 0.148 0 1 0.030  0.170 0 1
1 if childless  0.102 0.303 0 1 0.110  0.313 0 1
Number of children  2.04 1.09 0 14 2.04  1.12 0 16
Notes: 
*A few observations lack information on parental background, particularly father's age and schooling (5% 
missing in both subsamples).    30 
  














OLS 0.006***  –0.013***  –0.032***  –0.024***  0.030***  0.015***  0.005*** 
 (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
         
2SLS   0.011  –0.009  –0.080**  0.044  0.012  –0.008  0.021** 
 (0.018)  (0.087)  (0.039)  (0.032)  (0.028)  (0.018)  (0.009) 
         
  N  290596 290604 290604 290604 290604 290591 289057 
Notes: 
Each column is a separate regression. Included in the specifications are municipality and year-of-birth indicators.  
Municipality-specific trends are excluded due to non-significance. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 
the municipality level. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% 




Table 3. Regression Discontinuity Approach: sample restricted to those aged 13 within a 5 span 














OLS  0.005*** –0.012**  –0.033***  –0.024***  0.030*** 0.015*** 0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
2SLS  0.013 –0.004  –0.077**  0.049  0.016 –0.016 0.016 
  (0.022) (0.083) (0.032) (0.042) (0.032) (0.021) (0.012) 
         
N  227188 227217 227217 227217 227217 226977  22497 
Notes: 
Each column is a separate regression. Included in the specifications are municipality and year-of-birth indicators.  
Municipality-specific trends are excluded due to non-significance. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 
the municipality level. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
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Appendix 
 






Table A1. Estimates of the association between the date of reform implementation and lagged 
changes in teenage birth rate pre reform. 
Lag in change in 
teen birth rate 
(years)  Coef. Std.  Err. P>|z|  Pseudo-R2  N 
5  0.002 0.005 0.661  0.0001 3650 
4  0.004 0.005 0.437  0.0002 3142 
3  0.012 0.008 0.115  0.0008 2562 
2  0.010 0.013 0.454  0.0002 1940 
Notes: 
Hazard estimated using logit model. Each row is a separate estimation. Data used is combinations of 
municipalities and potential years of reform implementation, i.e. 1960-1972, up to the actual year of 
implementation.  The dependent variable equals 1 for the year when the reform was implemented, and 0 for pre-
reform years.  
    32 
Table A2. Test for exogeneity of the school reform at the municipality level 
  Year of introduction of reform 
  Coeff (se) 
Mean income  .000 (.000) 
% Tertiary education  -13.174 (16.18) 
% Secondary education  8.609 (9.47) 
% Primary education  -1.497 (2.21) 
% working in Services  -.006 (4.35) 
% working in Manufacturing  -2.797 (3.56) 
% out of labour force  -5.618 (8.87) 
% Married at least once  -4.649 (6.40) 
Log Municipal population  -.051 (0.19) 
% voting for the Labour party   -.335 (0.84) 
% in ages 0-17  -7.891 (7.32) 
% in ages 18-34  7.241 (10.03) 
% in ages 35-64  17.677 (10.96) 
County dummies  Yes 
Sample size  650 
R-squared 0.180 
Notes:  
All explanatory variables are aggregated from the 1960 census, except for the electoral results and turnout, 
which are from 1959 elections, and income data, which is from 1967. Dependent variable is birth year of first 
cohort subject to reform. 
 
Table A3.  Data selection  
 Number  of  observations 
Women born 1947–1958, in total  384385 
Excluded because of motherhood before age 15  101 
Excluded because woman’s education <7 years  783 
Missing on municipality  78952 
Missing on reform indicator  11841 
Missing on woman’s length of education  2104 
Sample size  290604 
 
 
Table A4.  First stage estimates: Years of education as a function of reform 
 Coef.  Std.  Err.  P>|t| 
Reform  0.116 0.017 0.000 
Cohort     
Born 1957  -0.094  0.022  0.000 
Born 1956  -0.151  0.021  0.000 
Born 1955  -0.178  0.022  0.000 
Born 1954  -0.238  0.022  0.000 
Born 1953  -0.257  0.023  0.000 
Born 1952  -0.329  0.024  0.000 
Born 1951  -0.379  0.026  0.000 
Born 1950  -0.456  0.027  0.000 
Born 1949  -0.549  0.028  0.000 
Born 1948  -0.706  0.028  0.000 
Born 1947  -0.797  0.029  0.000 
Constant 11.644  0.103  0.000 
N 290604     
Adjusted R-squared  0.0415     
Notes: 
The model also includes cohort fixed effects and municipality-fixed effects.  Municipality-specific trends are 
excluded due to non-significance in an OLS regression of fertility on years of schooling.  The 1958 birth cohort 
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